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ABSTRACT 
 
Role-based Access Control (RBAC) became popular because it can handle the complicated 
enterprise-wide access requests while traditional access control models such as mandatory 
access control and discretionary access control cannot. However, it is not suitable for a mobile 
environment because (i) there is no central trusted authentication entity that activates each 
user’s roles, (ii) there are not many roles involved in such environment, and (iii) access control 
decisions depend on specific actions to be performed before the decision is taken. In this paper, 
we introduce a provisional authorization model with location-based predicates embedded in the 
policy specification languages. It includes three classes of location-based conditions such as 
position-based, movement-based, and interaction-based conditions. As a result, users can specify 
their own privacy/security policies in a mobile ad-hoc environment such as mobile auction 
markets. 
 
Keywords: Access control policies; location-based services (LBS); mobile commerce; 
security/privacy; ad-hoc 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Mobile devices with wireless communication capabilities have become part of our lives. In a 
mobile environment, compared to the static desktop environment, network resources are 
constantly accessed through these devices while users are still moving. In this new mobile 
environment, it is easy to form a mobile ad-hoc network where neighboring mobile devices are 
forming a self-configuring network connected by wireless links. Examples include vehicular ad-
hoc networks (VANETs) where neighboring vehicles communicate important information on 
road conditions or ride-share, social networks for finding friends, navigation advice in 
transportation, asset tracking, and mobile collaborative work. Especially, application to mobile 
electronic commerce is in our particular interests such as online ad-hoc auction market 
environment where auctioneers allow bidding from neighboring potential buyers. 
 
In this environment, each mobile user is treated as a peer because one can retrieve data from 
one’s neighboring mobile devices, and at the same time, one can provide the information as the 
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other people request the information that she brings. This local search-and-discover action is 
performed by each peer without connecting to the centralized server. 
 
In order to protect one’s own resources, each peer specifies its own security/privacy policies. In a 
mobile peer-to-peer environment, access control decision depends on (i) specific actions 
performed before the decision is taken and (ii) also spatio-temporal attributes. First, connection 
between peers is arbitrary; and thus, it would be more appropriate if the access control decision 
is based on the conditions that the resource-holding peer has. For example, in online ad-hoc 
auction market, an auctioneer allows bidding of only serious users who meet the criteria such as 
reading and signing the contract beforehand. Second, access control decisions are also based on 
current locations (i.e., spatial attribute) of neighboring peers within the specific time durations 
(temporal attribute). For example, in location-based services (LBS) applications, a mobile user 
wants to receive promotion deals only if the current location of the user is within a certain 
distance from the merchant during the evening hours in order not to be overwhelmed by spam 
mails from merchants. 
 
The Role-based access control (RBAC) model is popular because it can handle complicated 
enterprise-wide access requests where the traditional access control models such as Mandatory 
Access Control (MAC) and Discretionary Access Control (DAC) cannot handle. In RBAC, a 
role denotes a job function, and permissions to perform certain operations are assigned to 
specific roles instead of users. Then, each user is assigned to particular roles. Although 
facilitating resource sharing with enforcing security/privacy policies in a static environment has 
been discussed (Maruoka, Memati, Barolli, Enokido & Takizawa, 2008; Park, An, & Chandra, 
2007; Park & Hwang, 2003; Ravichandran & Yoon, 2006; Silva et al. 2005), it is not applicable 
to a mobile ad-hoc environment due to the following reasons. 
 
First of all, existing RBAC cannot be directly applicable to a mobile ad-hoc environment since 
peers are constantly moving over time and the policies are updated based on time and space. A 
naïve solution would use a trusted party which authenticates each user and makes an access 
control decision. However, this is not practical especially for mobile ad-hoc environment where 
participating peers are not predetermined and do not have the capability to connect to the central 
server. Also, it creates an issue with scalability of the system because the trusted server must be 
able to deal with all the access control requests and evaluates each peer’s security policies. 
Considering the fact that these policies are based on space and time as well as specific actions 
that each peer has performed, overheads to the system to enforce these policies would not be 
scalable. Also, RBAC is not suitable because in such a context, there are not that many roles 
involved. As the word “peer” represents, in most cases, each user has the same privileges: for 
example, for file sharing environment, every user is authorized to access the contents as long as 
she has access to the system. Finally, in a mobile environment, the connection between peers is 
arbitrary, and thus, it would be more appropriate if the access control decision is based on the 
conditions that the resource-holding peer has. Usually, the conditions are specific actions that 
have been performed by the resource-requesting peers, and these specific actions as provisions. 
 
Provisional authorization models have been proposed where an access control decision is based 
on the provisions of requesting users (Jajodia, Kudo, & Subrahmanian, 2001; Kudo & Hada, 
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2000). However, the generic provisional authorization model does not address the nature of the 
peer’s mobility issues. Let us consider the following motivating example. 
 
Motivating Example: Consider the situation of a mobile ad-hoc auction market. A mobile seller 
creates a mobile auction place for mobile customers who are within a shopping mall. Auction 
models consist of a set of business rules and security policies such as ending conditions and 
confidentiality of the bidding information (Jajodia et al., 2001). In a sealed-bid auction, 
submitted bids must be kept secret, and any submission after the closing time must be rejected. 
The provisional authorization model with support to location-based predicates deals with these 
security policies in a structured way. Bidders can submit their bids while within their stay at the 
shopping mall. The bidding information is kept secret because the seller encrypts the bidding 
data with a cryptographic key, and the system timestamps the bid. There are two kinds of 
participants: supplier and bidders. First, the supplier fills in the item to be auctioned, the closing 
time of the auction, and the minimum price acceptable. Then, the auction information is 
published in the mobile ad-hoc networks located within the shopping mall. Any mobile peer who 
is interested in the item can submit a bid specifying the item and a bidding price. This bidding 
information is accommodated if the bidding ending time is not reached, and the bidding price is 
higher than the current bidding price. The seller can fill-in “No Good” in the status field if the 
current time is after closing time and the maximum price of all the bids is lower than the 
minimum price. 
 
In the mobile ad-hoc environment, security/privacy policies are spatio-temporal in nature as we 
discussed earlier: a peer is interested in the resources within the specific neighboring region and 
during a specific time interval without the actual knowledge of peers’ identifiers. For example, in 
mobile electronic commerce, sellers are interested in the buyers who are currently located in the 
same shopping mall. In order to limit properly the control of resources, the provisional 
authorizations must incorporate the spatio-temporal specifications within its model. In this paper, 
we introduce the provisional authorization models with location-based predicates embedded in 
the policy specification language in order to support mobile ad-hoc environments. Therefore, 
security can be even enforced more powerfully and efficiently by using provisions and location 
predicates. 
 
 
RELATED WORK 
 
Jajodia et al. (2001) introduce provisional authorization model, where access is granted only if 
certain conditions are satisfied; and Bettini, Jajodia, Wang, & Wijesekera (2003) extend this idea 
by introducing obligations in addition to provisions. Here, provisions are conditions that must be 
satisfied (i.e., certain actions to be performed) before an access is granted; obligations are 
conditions or actions that must be fulfilled after the access decision. They proposed a rule-based 
framework to select the appropriate set of provisions and obligations based on numerical weights 
and on semantic relationships among them. More recent work (Dougherty, Fisler, & 
Krishnamurthi, 2007; Hilty, Pretschner, Basin, Schaefer, & Walter, 2007) investigate the use and 
enforcement of such obligations. 
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Although there have been quite number of research work for facilitating collaboration among 
distributed users, relatively few works have concentrated on controlling access to the mobile ad-
hoc environment. Most collaborative systems give all participants the same rights to all objects, 
and expect that access issues will be controlled by a social protocol (Palomar, Tapiador, 
Hernandez-Castro, & Ribagorda, 2008). Generic access control models have been studied 
extensively in non-collaborative domains. Especially, RBAC model (da Silva, Gaspary, 
Barcellos, & Detsch, 2005; Maruoka et al., 2008; Park et al., 2007; Park & Hwang, 2003; 
Ravichandran & Yoon, 2006;) is popular because it can handle complicated enterprise-wide 
access requests where the traditional access control models cannot handle effectively. In this 
approach, the client/server scheme has been used for each access request. Each user request 
needs to connect to the server in order to acquire the access authorization. The main limitation is 
the feasibility since the server must handle all the access requests, which becomes the bottleneck 
of the system. Also, in the case of mobile P2P environments, it is insufficient to have role 
permissions based on object types. 
 
Other researchers have proposed ways to incorporate the concept of trust to RBAC (Chakraborty 
& Ray, 2005; Ya-Jun, Fan, Qing-Guo, & Rong, 2005). The general idea in these works is that the 
access privileges of a user depends on his trust level. However, the applicability of these models 
to mobile environments remains to be investigated. For mobile environments, (Khambatti, 
Dasgupta, & Ryu, 2004) investigated role-based trust model in the context of digital libraries. 
Each peer keeps its own list of book profile that she wants to share with others. If this profile 
matches with someone who keeps the book, the information is used for sharing his or her book. 
However, the usage of role is limited because a role simply denotes the trustworthiness, which is 
different from the perspective of this paper since different roles may specify different policies. 
Trust based access control is developed in the context of a P2P file-sharing network. A peer has 
the right to download files from other peers, but a resource holding peer can control the 
prospective downloads of its file. However, the access control is determined by the 
trustworthiness and performance of peers instead of their roles. Thus, the model cannot classify 
peers with different functionalities. Recent work by (Toahchoodee, Abdunabi, Ray, & Ray, 
2009) is close to our work. They proposed a trust-based RBAC model for pervasive computing 
systems. Users (humans or their representatives and devices) are evaluated for their 
trustworthiness, and roles are associated with a trust range indicating the minimum trust level 
that a user needs to attain before it can be assigned to that role. An access control request is 
granted for users whose trust level passes the minimum trust level. However, access control 
decision is still made in the central server, thus not applicable to the mobile ad-hoc environment. 
 
Some cryptographic-based mechanisms have been suggested to solve the problem of content 
distribution (Dodis & Fazio, 2002; Eschenauer & Gligor, 2009; Fiat & Naor, 1997; Libert, 
Paterson, & Quaglia, 2012). They focus on cryptographic technique for implementing compliant 
authorized domains. A distributed access control model is addressed in (Lopez, Oppliger, & 
Pernul, 2004) through the idea of authentication and authorization infrastructures. However, 
since there is no control on what others can do and cannot through delegation, delegation may 
cause issues. 
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Our work is orthogonal to all of the above work because they are not applicable to a mobile ad-
hoc environment, as they cannot support location-based conditions, and access control decisions 
depend on specific actions to be performed before the decision is taken rather than roles. 
 
 
AUTHORIZATION MODEL FOR MOBILE AD-HOC NETWORKS 
 
Traditional access control uses the model that a user makes an access request of a system in 
some context, and the system either authorizes the access request or denies it. However, today’s 
rapidly expanding environments, such as electronic commerce, make such models that authorize 
or deny a request overly simplistic and not accommodating Jajodia and Wijesekera (2004). In 
this section, we introduce generic provisional authorizations and how location-based conditions 
are embedded in the provisional authorization models in order to support the mobile ad-hoc 
networks. 
 
Provisional Authorization Models 
 
This section introduces a provisional authorization model proposed by Jajodia and Wijesekera 
2004. When clients submit an access request, the authentication module is invoked, which 
verifies if the user is the one that she claims to be. Then, the access request is provided to the 
provision evaluation module, which finds the conditions under which the requested access can be 
honored. Next, the condition under which the access may be granted is passed to an order 
specification module that yields a set of ordering constraints on the actions involved. Finally, the 
ordering constraints are handed off to a provision verification module to check if any conditions 
were previously fulfilled by the requester and, if so, simplifies the condition and waits for 
reduced conditions to be fulfilled by the requester before final authorization. 
 
Representation of the Policy Rules: The security policy rules are written using a number of 
predicates, such as cando, do, and dercando (Jajodia & Wijesekera, 2004). 
 
1. A ternary predicate cando(o, s, a), representing grantable or deniable requests where o, s, 
and a are object, subject, and a signed action term, respectively. 
2. A ternary predicate dercando(o, s, a), with the same arguments as cando representing 
authorizations derived by the system using logical rules of inference. 
3. A ternary predicate do, with the same arguments as cando, representing the access control 
decisions made by the system. 
4. A propositional symbol error indicating violation of an integrity constraint. 
5. The predicate in(x, y, “hierarchy name”) is used to specify properties of subject and object 
hierarchies. 
 
Representation of Provisions: Provisions are specified with the following form: 
 ∮: Head  Body (1) 
where ∮ is a predicate for provisions. Jajodia et al. introduce a provisional authorization 
specification language pASLL (Jajodia et al., 2001). pASLL is based on the declarative, 
polynomially evaluable authorization specification language ASL. The following set of rules 
model provisional accesses for an online store: 
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1. register(s, customer): cando(items, s, +buy)  in(contract, Contracts) 
2. upgrade(s, prefCust): dercando(item, s, +buy)  cando(item, s, +buy) 
3. payFees(s, $50): do(item, s, +buy)  cando(item, s, +buy) 
4. payFees(s, $40): do(item, s, +buy)  dercando(items, s, +buy) 
 
The first two rules allow a customer to purchase by registering and further allow the customer to 
upgrade her registration to a preferred customer. Next two rules state that the purchase price of 
an item is $50 for a non-preferred customer and $40 for a preferred customer. Therefore, a 
customer has the choice of either remaining in the non-preferred category with paying $50, or 
registering as a preferred customer and paying $40 per item (Jajodia et al., 2001). 
 
Supporting Location-based Predicates 
 
The provisional authorization model does not provide the location-based predicates within the 
model. Thus, it cannot handle the security policies where the location-based predicates are 
specified. Ardagna et al. 2006 proposed the location-based conditions that can be used in access 
control policies. The main advantage of the proposed model is that the model can be embedded 
in any currently available access control system to support location-based predicates without the 
necessity to introduce new specification languages. Also, the proposed model’s stipulated 
location-based predicates are well defined. 
 
The model proposes three main classes of location-based conditions: 
 position-based conditions on the location of the user: for instance, to evaluate whether a user 
is in the proximity of other entities 
 movement-based conditions on the mobility of the users such as their velocity, acceleration, 
or direction where they are headed. 
 interaction-based conditions relating multiple users or entities: for instance, the number of 
users within a given area. 
 
The location-based predicates are expressed as Boolean queries, and their evaluation returns a 
triple [bool_value, confidence, timeout]. The bool_value is based on either True or False if a user 
access request asks whether a user is located inside a given region. Because none of the current 
technology fully ensures the exact user location (Horsmanheimo, Jormakka, & Lahteenmaki, 
2004), there exists uncertainty about location information. The confidence expresses the level of 
reliability that the location information is guaranteed to be accurate within the specified intervals. 
Also, the assessment (True or False) of the user request has a time validity interval specified by a 
timeout parameter. 
 
The model includes the following predicates 
 A position predicate inarea evaluates whether a user is located within a specific area. 
 A position predicate disjoint evaluates whether a user is outside a specific area. Of course, 
disjoint is the equivalent to the negation of inarea. 
 A position predicate distance evaluates whether the user lies within a given distance from the 
specified entity. The entity involved in the evaluation can be either stable or moving. 
 A movement predicate velocity evaluates whether the user speed lies within a given range of 
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velocity. 
 An interaction predicate density evaluates whether the number of users currently in an area 
lies within the interval specified. 
 
Location-based 
Predicates 
Evaluation 
Result 
Description 
inarea(Alice, Newark) 
[True, 0.9, 2011-
11-09_11:10am] 
Alice is located in Newark with a confidence of 
90%. Such an assessment is to be considered 
valid until 11:10am of November 11, 2011. 
velocity( 
Alice, 70, 90) 
[True, 0.8, 2011-
11-03_03:00pm] 
Alice is traveling at a speed included in the range 
[70,90] with a confidence of 80%. 
 
Table 1: Examples of Location-based Predicates. 
 
Table 1 shows the example of location-based predicates. The example presents position-type 
predicates and movement-based conditions. 
 
Representation of Location-based Provisions 
 
Location-based provisions are specified in the same way that non-location-based provisions do, 
which is shown in (1). It is important to observe that confidence plays a role for accuracy of user 
locations. Therefore, a threshold for confidence may need to be set up. Ardagna, Cremonini, 
Damiani, di Vimercati, and Samarati (2006) introduce the concept of an Extended True Table 
(ETT) for custom confidence thresholds for each predicate. For example, suppose the confidence 
threshold for the inarea predicate is [0.8, 0.9]. If the confidence is less than 0.8, the returned 
Boolean value is not confirmed, and the location-based condition is set to false. If the confidence 
level is above 0.9, then returned Boolean value is confirmed. If the threshold level is between 0.8 
and 0.9, predicate re-evaluation is triggered because under the current threshold level, the 
returned value is not confirmed. The maximum number of tries is specified in order to prevent 
the deadlock situation. 
 
Now, we have all the capabilities to specify the access control policies for mobile ad-hoc auction 
market. The following example is based on the work by (Jajodia et al. 2001), and we extend it by 
incorporating location-based provisions. 
 
1. cando(supplier_info, X, +rw)  in(X, supplier) 
2. cando(supplier_info, X, +r)  in(X, bidder) ^ inarea(X, ShoppingMall) 
3. cando(bid, A1, +r)  owner(bid, A1) ^ uid(A1) 
4. encrypt(Price, key1)^timestamp(Price, tsa1): cando(bidder_info, A1, +w(Price))  
not(done(bidder_info, A1, +w(Price’))) ^ uid(A1) ^ time(T) ^ field(closing_time, A2) ^ T < 
A2. 
5. write(winning_price, -1): cando(status, supplier, +w(“No Good”))  current_top(A1) ^ 
field(minimum_price, A2) ^ A1 < A2 ^ time(T) ^ field(closing_time, A3)^T >= A3 
6. write(winning_price, A1): cando(status, auctioneer, +w(“Completed”))  current_top(A1) ^ 
field(minimum_price, A2) ^ A1 >= A2 ^ time(T) ^ field(closing_time, A3) ^ T >= A3 
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The first two rules specify that the supplier can read and write any fields in supplier_info node, 
and the bidder who is in the shopping mall can read any fields in supplier_info. The third rule 
specifies that the bidder who submitted bid data can read her data. The forth rule specifies that if 
the bidder has not submitted a bid before the closing time of the auction is not reached, a bidder 
can submit a bid, if price is encrypted with time release key key1 and timestamp from tsa1 
authority is recorded. The fifth rule specifies that if the maximum price of submitted bids is 
lower than the minimum price and the current time is after the closing time, the seller writes “No 
Good” in the status field in the system_info section, if error code is written in winning_price 
field. The last rule specifies that if the maximum price of submitted bids is equal to or greater 
than the minimum price and the current time is after the closing price, the supplier writes 
“Completed” in the status field in the system_info section, provided the highest price is written in 
the winning_price field. 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
We assume that the identification of a peer (user) is properly authenticated and its claimed 
location is properly verified . In the traditional static client/server architecture, the authentication 
procedure is rather standardized. However, in the mobile ad-hoc environment, it raises some 
issues with authentication. It mainly comes from the limited resources of mobile devices. Due to 
the mobile nature, the mobile devices will not necessarily be on-line to other networks except the 
mobile ad-hoc network. Therefore, in a typical case, a peer with resources does not have any 
prior knowledge about the peer who asks an access request. Thus, the authentication process is 
rather problematic. 
 
Among the works to address this authentication problem in the context of mobile ad-hoc 
environment, DUMAS (Dynamic User Management and Access Control System) was an 
interesting solution by Fenkam, Dustdar, Kirda, Reif, & Gall (2002). There are two types of 
mobile peers: L1 peers (Peers of Level 1) and L2 peers. L1 peers are peers that maintain a 
security infrastructure. This includes the complete intelligence for assigning permissions, 
revoking permissions, and also providing authentication. To use a service protected by a L1 peer, 
a user must present his authorization certificates including his authentication information. L2 
peers are devices lacking the resources for instantiating the full DUMAS engine. L2 peers utilize 
the power of L1 peers to verify authorization certificates related to the service it provides. 
Obviously, the main disadvantage of this architecture is that if an adhoc mobile network does not 
include L1 peers, authentication of consisting peers cannot be processed. However, with the 
reasonable number of L1 peers, the security of a system can actually work fine because at least 
one L1 peer in the adhoc network can provide the security environment for participating peers. 
However, this work does not address the location verification problem, which will be addressed 
in our future work. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Mobile ad-hoc environments are characterized by its local ad-hoc network formation, which can 
be used for searching for local resources of the users’ interests. In most of cases, the local 
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resources are available during a limited duration of time and proximately located with the user. 
For example, the local search-and-discover, for example, can happen in many applications such 
as social networks for finding friends, navigation advice in transportation, mobile electronic 
commerce, asset tracking, and mobile collaborative work. 
 
The main purpose of this paper is to develop an access control system for mobile ad-hoc 
environments. In this setting, each peer has its own security/privacy policies for protecting its 
resources. In this paper, we introduced the provisional authorization models with location-based 
predicates embedded in the policy specification languages. The mobile ad-hoc auction markets 
are used as a motivating example to explain the concept of the proposed model. 
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